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Abstract
This paper analyzes the welfare effects of a public smoking ban in
bars. We construct a model that captures crucial features of bar life:
competing bars, social interaction, and heterogenous preferences for
a smoking ban. Smokers and non-smokers simultaneously choose a
bar given their preferences for meeting other people. Bars anticipate
the behavior of individuals and choose the smoking regime strategi-
cally. Since the (dis)utility from smoking and social interaction are
substitutes, the smoking regime is a stronger coordination device if
the disutility from smoking is large. If all bars allow smoking in equi-
librium, a public smoking ban enhances welfare.
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1 Introduction
In recent years, public smoking bans have been mushrooming in many coun-
tries all over the world. Smoking is typically banned in federal buildings,
hospitals, schools, universities, and workplaces, among other public areas.
In many states, smoking is also banned in restaurants, bars, and the like.
The motivation for policymakers to ban smoking in bars and restaurants
is that it burdens a negative externality on non-smokers due to the severe
health effects caused by second-hand smoke. Although this argument at first
glance provides a profound justification for the ban, second thoughts about
the issue also pose a puzzle, at least from an economist’s point of view.
The decision about whether or not to visit a bar should be based on the
optimizing behavior of agents. If the negative effect of smoking exceeds the
marginal gain of going out, agents should decide to stay at home or demand
non-smoking restaurants. Moreover, if the marginal gain of smoking in a bar
is large, bars should in fact be able to allow smoking. Thus, since there is a
market for (potentially different) bar services, the smoking externality should
either be internalized or there should be some kind of Coase mechanism
that, again, would result in the optimal choice of the smoking regime. The
latter argument, for example, is put forward by Boyes and Marlow (1996),
who claim that a public smoking ban in bars is merely a distributive device
without any allocation effect.
Before the implementation of smoking bans, the vast majority of bars and
restaurants allowed their customers to smoke. As an example, this was true
for 99.7% of Germany’s 240,000 bars, cafe´s, and restaurants. According to
the Coasian argument above, this should be the optimal allocation, and no
public intervention should be needed. However, polls show that more than
60% of European citizens would like to see smoking banned in bars. It seems
that there is demand for smoke-free places but no supply: an observation
that is somewhat at odds with the claim that the unregulated allocation is
efficient.
In this paper, we argue that the efficiency argument ignores an important
aspect of the restaurant and bar choice of individuals: social interaction.
Individuals enjoy meeting other individuals in bars. Thus, their bar choice is
driven not only by the smoking regime of the particular bar (the strength of
the negative externality) but also by the expected number of fellow guests.
This coordination mechanism may result in lock-in effects and offers bars and
restaurants a strategic device to gain a competitive advantage over other
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bars and restaurants. The bottom line of this coordination externality is
that the decentralized choices do not necessarily resemble the Pareto efficient
allocation.
To analyze the effects of a public smoking ban on the hospitality mar-
ket, we construct a theoretical model that captures crucial features of bar
life: competition among bars, social interaction among customers, and het-
erogenous preferences regarding smoking in a bar. To keep things simple,
we separate individuals into two groups. Smokers retain a utility gain when
smoking in a bar is allowed whereas non-smokers lose utility in this situa-
tion. In addition to the preferences regarding smoking, we add preferences
for social interaction. That is, all individuals have a desire to meet with
other individuals in bars. This social interaction motive implies a preference
for the bar that attracts the highest expected number of guests. The idea is
that a large number of customers raises the probability of meeting interest-
ing individuals. The bars we consider are structurally identical (i.e., they are
perfect substitutes given a common smoking regime). However, they can use
the smoking regime to compete for customers. Bars ban or allow smoking
to become more attractive to either smokers or non-smokers. Moreover, if
individuals prefer company in a bar, the smoking regime choice can be used
strategically to coordinate individuals on a bar. The smoking regime choice,
hence, is not only used to meet the customers’ preferences for smoke(ing),
but also as a strategy to gain a competitive advantage. This may result in a
trade-off, which is at the heart of our analysis.
We capture these features in a two-stage game where bars choose the
smoking regime at the first stage. At the second stage, individuals choose
“their” bar. Using backward induction, we solve the latter subgame for a
mixed strategy Nash equilibrium. On the basis of this equilibrium, we com-
pute the expected number of guests in each bar as a function of the smoking
regime. Given these payoffs, we determine the profit-maximizing smoking
regime choice of competing bars. The resulting strategies bring forth our
main results. First, in equilibrium, bars will never choose different smok-
ing regimes. Second, if both bars choose to allow smoking, a smoking ban
enhances welfare in the hospitality market. These results are driven by the
interplay of the social interaction motive and competition among bars. Util-
ity maximization requires all individuals to be mutually indifferent between
bars in expectations (this is captured by the Nash equilibrium in mixed
strategies in the coordination subgame). This indifference is anticipated by
each of the bars and, given the smoking regime choice of the competing bar,
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generates a tendency to allow smoking precisely in situations where the disu-
tility from smoking among non-smokers is large relative to the utility gained
by smokers from being allowed to smoke. From the point of view of a sin-
gle bar (and holding the other bar’s smoking regime fixed), the customers’
unfavored smoking regime is then complementary to its expected number
of guests. Accordingly, in this example where the disutility from smoking
among non-smokers is large, allowing customers to smoke becomes a pow-
erful coordination device. Turning to the choice of the social planner, we
are able to show that the planner will always deviate from the decentral-
ized smoking regime solution. This is due to the fact that the planner does
not rely on the smoking regime as a coordination device, but uses it only
to maximize customer’s utility. Hence, a public smoking ban may enhance
welfare.
There is only a little theoretical research into the economic effects of
smoking bans on the hospitality market. In a very recent paper, Poutvaara
and Siemers (2009) analyze the Nash equilibrium smoking regime outcome
in a bar/restaurant given different social norms concerning the accommoda-
tion of smoking. They show that (depending on the social norm) there may
be an inefficient smoking regime outcome. This could be used as an argu-
ment for a public smoking ban as a second-best policy although a Coasian
solution would yield the first-best outcome. Our paper takes a different per-
spective on the problem since we do not focus on the limited situation of
an exogenous meeting of a smoker and a non-smoker as they do. We allow
for social interaction and consider a richer choice set of individuals: endoge-
nous participation and choice of the smoking regime (the strategic variable
of bars).
The majority of papers on smoking bans claim that there is no need
for governmental interventions in the case of privately owned businesses like
bars (see Tollison and Wagner, 1992, Lee, 1991, Boyes and Marlow, 1996,
and Dunham and Marlow, 2000, 2003, 2004). In general, these studies do
not provide a full-fledge theoretical framework but rest on the application
of the Coase theorem. As long as property rights are well defined a wel-
fare maximizing bargain between smokers and non-smokers is possible and
no intervention is needed. Hence, a public smoking ban is inefficient and
hinders bar owners in choosing the smoking regime that accomodates guests’
needs.
The applicability of the Coase Theorem in the case of smoking bans, how-
ever, is at least debatable. Phelps (1992) for example opposed the full prop-
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erty rights approach earlier, claiming that “the transaction costs of reaching
agreements would overwhelm the problem” (p. 430). We further conjec-
ture that participation is likely to be endogenous since customers can choose
unilaterally “their” bar. Hence, the Coase theorem may fail to hold (see,
e.g., Dixit and Olson, 2000, on failures of the Coase theorem in games with
endogenous participation). Finally, our paper points to the strategic nature
of the smoking regime choice. Applying competition among bars and social
interaction among customers, the paper provides a specific example where
the allocation of property rights is used as a strategic device and thus no
longer exclusively reflects individuals’ preferences.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up
the model and discusses the game structure. Section 3 solves the model,
characterizes the equilibrium, and provides some intuition for the model’s
mechanics. Section 4 describes the equilibrium when a social planner dictates
the welfare-maximizing smoking regime in the bars. A comparison of the
market equilibrium and the planner solution proves our main results. Section
5 concludes.
2 The Model
Our model is completely described by individuals’ preferences for going out,
the bars’ technologies, and the structure of the game. We describe each in
turn.
2.1 Preferences
Individuals enjoy going out and meeting other bar customers. Consider a
market where NS smokers (for simplicity defined as individuals who smoke
and appreciate smoking in a bar) and NNS non-smokers (defined as individ-
uals who do not smoke and dislike smoking in a bar) choose to either visit
bar i or bar j.1 The utility of a smoker and non-smoker from visiting bar i is
USi = V
S + γ
(
nSi + n
NS
i − 1
)
+ θiα, (1)
UNSi = V
NS + γ(nSi + n
NS
i − 1)− θiβn
S
i , (2)
1We use this classification to keep the interpretation straightforward. More generally,
the two types of individuals can be thought of as smaller groups of individuals who as a
group perceive that smoking in a bar comes at a net utility gain or loss, respectively.
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where the three terms in each utility function capture the utility derived
from consuming bar i’s service, meeting other guests in bar i, and facing bar
i’s smoking regime choice, respectively. The first terms, the utility from bar
services like food offers and drinks, are identical across bars, but may differ
between smokers (V S) and non-smokers (V NS). The second terms reflect
the desire for social interaction, which in our view is one of the primary
reasons for visiting a bar. In particular, we assume “the more the merrier”
preferences, i.e., the utility from visiting bar i increases in the total number
of fellow guests in bar i, nSi +n
NS
i −1, where n
S
i and n
NS
i denote the number
of smokers and non-smokers in bar i, respectively. Hence, each customer
who shows up in a bar exerts an externality on other customers. The third
terms finally capture the impact of bar i’s smoking regime choice (θi). If
smoking is prohibited, the basic utilities from visiting bar i (i.e., ignoring
social interaction) are equal to V S and V NS for smokers and non-smokers,
respectively.2 If smoking is allowed, in contrast, θi = 1 and the basic utility
from visiting bar i increases by α for each smoker, but decreases by βnSi for
each non-smoker. The simple idea behind the non-smoker’s utility loss is
that it is determined by the amount of tobacco smoke in bar i, which in turn
is an increasing function of the number of smokers in that bar.3 Accordingly,
the presence of a smoker is less advantageous to a non-smoker if smoking is
allowed in the bar. In what follows, however, we concentrate on γ > β, i.e.,
the case where fellow smokers are overall “valuable” to non-smokers in any
smoking regime.4
2.2 Bars
Bars supply food and drinks and provide a space to meet other individuals.
By assumption, this service is produced at zero marginal costs. To keep
the model concise, we further rule out any effects from choosing prices or
the size of the bars strategically. The implicit assumption is that prices
2Our choice of V S and V NS as the basic utility obtained from visiting a bar that bans
smoking is arbitrary. Equivalently, V S and V NS can be denominated in terms of a bar
that allows smoking. Crucially, we require that each smoking regime choice benefits one
group and disadvantages the other.
3Given the high costs of smoke abatement and real-world evidence, we ignore the bar’s
option to implement an effective smoke funnel technology.
4This parameter restriction is not essential for our findings. To guarantee
the existence of an equilibrium, however, we exclude the non-generic case βγ =
NSNNS/
(
NS +NNS − 1
)
.
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are exogenously fixed above marginal costs, and bars being sufficiently large
to eliminate possible crowding or queuing effects.5 With this, bars simply
choose the smoking regime dummy θi in order to maximize their (expected)
number of guests.
2.3 Game Structure
The important features of the environment described so far are (i) when
visiting either one of the two bars, each individual affects all other individuals’
utility from going out and (ii) this externality is a function of the smoking
regime in the bars. We continue to set up the model as a two-stage game. At
the first stage, bars simultaneously choose the smoking regime. At the second
stage, individuals simultaneously decide whether to visit bar i or bar j. Since,
at the margin, individuals prefer the most popular bar, the simultaneous bar
choice adds an important feature: (iii) when choosing “their” bar, individuals
do not know which bar will be chosen by other (smoking and non-smoking)
individuals. We consider optimizing individuals to randomize over their pure
strategies to cope with this coordination problem.6
3 Market Equilibrium
Figure 1 illustrates the extensive form of the game. The top part depicts
the first stage, where both bars simultaneously choose the smoking regime
(the regime choice game). Below, any individual (labeled 1 in the figure)
chooses the appropriate bar knowing its smoking regime. Simultaneously, all
other individuals (2, 3 and so on) choose “their” respective bar knowing the
smoking regime, but not knowing 1’s bar choice (the coordination game). An
equilibrium consists of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in the coordina-
tion game, i.e., a probability distribution for each individual that maximizes
her expected utility given the optimal probability distribution chosen by all
other individuals, and a smoking regime choice of each bar that maximizes
5For an analysis of the strategic price setting behavior, see Bauer and Lingens (2008).
6Note that since we solve a static game of complete information with simultaneous
moves, there is no herding (like, e.g., in the example considered in Bikchandani et al. 1992
or Banerjee 1992). Arguably, herding effects would be interesting in their own respect
(Does the smoking regime choice induce herding? If so, what is the direction of the
herd?). Sticking to the simplest possible model, we leave this aspect for future research.
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Figure 1: Extensive Form of the Smoking Regime Game
expected profits (i.e., the number of guests) given the equilibrium outcome
of the coordination game. We solve the entire game by backward induction,
starting with the coordination game.
3.1 Equilibrium in the Coordination Subgame
We obtain the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in two steps. First, we
derive separate conditions for smokers and non-smokers that leave an agent
indifferent between the two bars given the randomization of all other agents.
Second, we use the two resulting indifference relationships to calculate the
equilibrium randomization of smokers and non-smokers.
3.1.1 Indifference of Non-Smokers
From the point of view of an agent who takes all other agents’ decisions
as given, the expected number of smokers and non-smokers in any bar is
uncorrelated. Hence, the expected value of a non-smoker who decides to
choose bar i is given by
E(UNSi ) =
NS∑
nS
i
=0
NNS−1∑
nNS
i
=0
f(nSi )g(n
NS
i )
(
V NS + γ(nSi + n
NS
i )− θiβn
S
i
)
, (3)
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where E denotes the expectation operator, f(.) is the distribution function
of the number of smokers, and g(.) is the distribution function of the number
of non-smokers. Similarly, the expected value of a smoker who chooses to
visit bar i reads
E(USi ) =
NS−1∑
nS
i
=0
NNS∑
nNS
i
=0
f(nSi )g(n
NS
i )
(
V NS + γ(nSi + n
NS
i ) + θiα
)
. (4)
Since both nSi and n
NS
i are binominally distributed (for a similar ap-
proach, see Dixit and Olson, 2000), equation (3) can be rewritten as
E(UNSi ) = V
NS + (γ − θiβ)P
S
i N
S + γPNSi (N
NS − 1), (5)
where P Si and P
NS
i are the (yet to be determined) probabilities of a smoker
and a fellow non-smoker, respectively, to visit bar i. Accordingly, a non-
smoker is indifferent between bars i and j if E(UNSi ) = E(U
NS
j ), which, using
the fact that P Si + P
S
j = P
NS
i + P
NS
j = 1, requires
((γ − θiβ)P
S
i − (1− P
S
i )(γ − θjβ))N
S = (1− 2PNSi )γ(N
NS − 1),
where E(Gi) ≡ N
SP Si +N
NSPNSi denotes the expected number of guests in
bar i. Collecting the probability terms on the left-hand side and denoting
the expected number of guests in bar i by E(Gi) = N
SP Si + N
NSPNSi , we
obtain7
2γE(Gi)−
(
(θi + θj)βN
SP Si + 2γP
NS
i
)
= γ(NNS − 1) + (γ − θjβ)N
S ≡ φ1.
(6)
This indifference condition already reveals some important aspects of our
model. Consider, e.g., a situation where bar i unilaterally deviates from
the no-smoking regime (θi = 0) and chooses to allow smoking (θi = 1).
Then, holding E(Gi) constant, the expected composition of smokers and non-
smokers in bar i must adapt to keep a non-smoker indifferent. That is, with
E(Gi) constant, the expected number of smokers in bar i must decrease,
while the expected number of non-smokers must increase.8 Alternatively,
holding the composition of guests constant, the expected number of guests
7We introduce the additional endogenous variable E(Gi) because it allows a straight-
forward interpretation and proof of Proposition 2 below.
8This composition change is more pronounced if the externalities from smoking (β) are
large or if the benefits from meeting others (γ) is small.
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must increase. Allowing individuals to smoke is then an effective device to
coordinate (both types of) individuals on bar i.
Condition (6) is a first equation that relates the (endogenous) probabil-
ity choice of smokers and non-smokers, P Si and P
NS
i (recall that E(Gi) ≡
P Si N
S + PNSi N
NS). A second equation in the same variables is readily de-
rived from the indifference condition of the non-smokers. Performing analo-
gous steps to the above yields
2γE(Gi)− 2γP
S
i = γ(N
S − 1) + γNNS − (θi − θj)α ≡ φ2. (7)
The interpretation of (7) is very similar to that of (6). If bar i chooses the
smoking regime (θi = 1), the bar makes itself more attractive for smokers
(hence, non-smokers are no longer indifferent either). In contrast to the non-
smokers’ case, however, the indifference of a smoker can only be restored
by a lower expected number of guests in bar i. There is no composition
effect since, for a smoker, fellow smokers and non-smokers are always perfect
substitutes. Thus, from the point of view of bar i, the smoking regime is now
a device to coordinate individuals on bar j.
The definition of E(Gi), (6), and (7) can be solved for E(Gi), P
S
i , and
PNSi as a function of the smoking regimes θi and θj (i.e., the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium in the coordination game). To do so, we express the system
of equations in matrix notation:
2γ −(θi + θj)βN
S −2γ
2γ −2γ 0
−1 NS NNS


︸ ︷︷ ︸
A

E(Gi)P Si
PNSi

 =

φ1φ2
0

 , (8)
With this, we obtain the expected number of guests in bar i, the probability
of a smoker visiting bar i, and the probability of a non-smoker visiting bar i
in the coordination game equilibrium as
E(Gi) =
−2γ(NSφ2 +N
NSφ1) +N
NSφ2(θi + θj)βN
S
|A|
, (9)
P Si =
2γNNS(φ2 − φ1)− 2γφ2
|A|
, (10)
PNSi =
(θi + θj)βN
Sφ2 + 2γN
Sφ1 − 2γφ1 − 2γN
Sφ2
|A|
, (11)
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where the determinant of the coefficient matrix is given by |A| = 4γ2(1 −
NS−NNS)+2βγNSNNS (θi + θj) .
9 The equilibrium reflects the ambiguous
effects of a bar’s smoking regime choice. At first, imposing a smoking ban
makes the bar more attractive for non-smokers (and less so for smokers). The
result, however, is an adjustment not only in the expected number of guests
but also in the composition of guests. These adjustments influence again the
relative attractiveness of the bar and hence the decisions of individuals.
3.2 Equilibrium
In this section, we characterize the equilibrium’s properties. In particular,
without loss of generality, we derive the smoking regime choice of bar i, which
aims at maximizing the expected number of guests given the subgame perfect
Nash equilibrium in the coordination game.
As a prerequisite, consider the situation where both bars choose identical
smoking regimes, i.e. θi = θj = θ. Imposing θ = 1 and θ = 0 in (9)–(11),
respectively, proves
Lemma 1 If both bars chose identical smoking regimes, the expected number
of guests in each location is E(Gi) =
NS+NNS
2
. In expectations, the fraction
of smokers is equalized across the two bars (P Si = P
NS
i = .5).
The intuition for this result is straightforward: with identical bars, both a
smoking individual and a non-smoking individual are only indifferent between
the two bars if every individual chooses each bar with probability .5. Since
the mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium requires mutual indifference, this is the
only equilibrium. Thus, it is expected that half of all individuals choose bar
i. Keeping this finding in mind, we turn to the interesting question of which
smoking regime is actually chosen by the two bars in equilibrium. As a first
result, we rule out mixed smoking regimes.
Proposition 1 In any Nash equilibrium, both bars choose the same smoking
regime.
Proof. By contradiction. Suppose that any mixed smoking regime choice,
say θi = 1 and θj = 0, is a Nash equilibrium. Then, a unilateral deviation
of bar i is not profitable. We thus have E(Gi[θi = 1; θj = 0]) ≥ E(Gi[θi =
0; θj = 0]). This, however, directly implies E(Gi[θi = 1; θj = 0]) ≤ E(Gi[θi =
9The parameter restriction in footnote 4 ensures |A| 6= 0.
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1; θj = 1]) (see the Appendix). Accordingly, bar j has an incentive to deviate
and (θi = 1, θj = 0) cannot be a Nash equilibrium. Symmetry completes the
proof.
We conclude from Proposition 1 and symmetry that either θi = θj = 1 or
θi = θj = 0 are dominant strategies. The (non-)smoking regime provides a
sufficiently strong coordination mechanism to prevent any bar from using its
smoking regime as a differentiation device and run the risk of being identified
as the “wrong” bar. Evidently, it depends on the parameter vector whether
the “wrong” bar is a bar that bans or allows smoking. In particular, both
bars will allow smoking if a unilateral deviation from the smoking regime
results in less than N
S+NNS
2
guests, i.e., if
βγNNSNS +NSα(βNNS − 2γ)
|A|
< 0 (12)
⇔
(1 + α
γ
)NNS − 2α
β
2NNS − 4 γ
ρβ
(1 + 1
ρ
− 1
NNS
)
< 0, (13)
where ρ ≡ N
S
NNS
denotes the fraction of smokers relative to non-smokers (see
the Appendix). While we require an explicit parameter vector to determine
the equilibrium smoking regime, we can identify influencing variables that
promote either one of the two smoking regimes. Quite intuitively, a large
number of non-smokers (NNS) and a pronounced aversion against fellow
smokers (a large β) favors the smoke-free equilibrium. Similarly, smokers
who value smoking not very much (so that α is small) promote the non-
smoking regime. These direct effects originate from the fact that each smok-
ing regime benefits one type of customers, but comes at a cost for the other
type of customers. As indicated earlier, there are additional effects from so-
cial interaction and competition among bars. To begin with, if smoking is
valued relative to meeting other people (such that α/γ is large), the smoking
regime is less likely to occur in equilibrium. At first glance, this result is
counterintuitive. If smokers have strong preferences regarding smoking in a
bar, while not caring much about meeting others, why, then, should this favor
the non-smoking equilibrium? The resolution rests at the heart of the Nash
equilibrium in the coordination game, where utility maximization requires all
agents to keep each other mutually indifferent between the bars. If smokers
value smoking very much (relative to meeting others), they lean toward a
bar that allows smoking. Now, if there is also a non-smoking bar, many indi-
viduals assign high probabilities to the non-smoking bar to keep the smokers
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indifferent. This reaction is strong since, in the case where α/γ is low, smok-
ers do not value their fellow guests very much. With this, the smoke-filled
bar is tempted to switch to a smoking ban to re-coordinate individuals and
increase the bar’s expected number of guests. Much in the same vein, if
the social externality is large relative to the disutility of non-smokers from
having fellow smokers in a bar that allows smoking (so that γ/β is large),
the smoking regime is more likely to emerge in equilibrium. Starting from
a situation where smoking is allowed in both bars, a deviating bar becomes
somewhat more attractive to non-smokers. This reallocation, however, is
weak as non-smokers view fellow smokers as good substitutes already under
the smoking regime. Note, however, that there is again a counteracting ef-
fect that keeps smokers indifferent: more individuals will choose the smoking
regime, hence deterring the initial deviation of the bar, and “stabilizing” the
smoking regime. Finally, consider the effect from the fraction of smokers,
ρ. Again, this effect is counterintuitive: a relative decline in the number of
smokers strengthens the case for the smoking regime. The intuition here is
that, in addition to the expected direct effect of allowing customers to smoke,
there are two indirect coordination effects. On the one hand, a smoking ban
increases the number of guests in the deviating bar to keep smokers indiffer-
ent. On the other hand, however, a smoking ban also increases the number
of guests in the remaining non-smoking bar such that the non-smokers are
indifferent. Once there are only a few smokers (relative to the number of
non-smokers), the latter effect will overcompensate for the first effect. Then,
a deviation is less likely to be profitable, fostering the smoking regime.
4 Social Planner – Welfare
In the previous section, we derived the Nash equilibrium in the case where
bars competitively choose the smoking regime to maximize their expected
number of guests. In this section, we contrast this market equilibrium with
the choice of a social planner who takes the coordination friction among the
individuals as given. Hence, the planner is not able to assign each individ-
ual to a bar, but can directly choose the smoking regime of the bars. This
somewhat resembles the real-world situation where governments implement
smoking bans. Given this environment, we ask whether a smoking ban en-
hances welfare if all bars choose to allow smoking in the market equilibrium.
Solving the constrained planner’s problem, we answer in the affirmative: im-
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posing a smoking ban in our model enhances welfare.
To prove this result, consider first the planner’s objective. The expected
aggregate welfare is given by
P Si N
S
E(USi ) + P
S
j N
S
E(USj ) + P
NS
i N
NS
E(UNSi ) + P
NS
j N
NS
E(UNSj ). (14)
Using the fact that P Si + P
S
j = 1, P
NS
i + P
NS
j = 1 and an individual’s indif-
ference between the two bars in the coordination game equilibrium (which
boils down to identical expected utilities in both bars), (14) can be rewritten
as
NSE(USi ) +N
NS
E(UNSi ). (15)
Plugging (4) and (5) in (15) and doing some manipulation, we obtain
W ≡ NSV S +NNSV NS + γE(Gi)(N
S +NNS − 1)+ θiN
Sα− θiN
NSβNSP Si .
(16)
Expected aggregate welfare W thus consists of four parts: i) the basic utility
of visiting either bar (V S and V NS), aggregated over all individuals; ii) the
expected number of guests (which reflects the utility from social interaction)
aggregated over all but one individual (which is due to the fact that social
interaction excludes oneself); and, depending on the smoking regime iii) the
smokers’ aggregate utility from smoking or iv) the aggregate negative effect
from smoking experienced by non-smokers.
Armed with the expression for aggregate welfare, we are able to answer
two questions. First, what are the welfare consequences of implementing a
strict smoking ban in a situation where all bars allow smoking in equilibrium
(this basically resembles the situation in many OECD countries that chose
to implement smoking bans)? Second, which smoking regime maximizes
welfare?
Consider first the impact of a smoking ban if bars choose to allow smok-
ing. We know that, given the equilibrium in the cooperation subgame, the
expected number of guests is the same independent of whether both bars
allow or ban smoking. Hence, choosing the smoking regime is profitable for
bars once the negative smoking externality is large (and the utility gain from
smoking is small) since this makes individuals choose the respective bar (in
order to keep everybody mutually indifferent). In this situation, each bar
chooses the smoking regime to coordinate individuals away from the other
bar. The problem, however, is that both bars have this incentive. In the end,
both bars are identical and welcome half of all individuals. We thus obtain
the following Proposition.
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Proposition 2 If both bars choose to allow smoking in equilibrium, a public
smoking ban enhances welfare.
Proof. If both bars allow smoking in equilibrium, it must be that (12)
holds, and, as shown in the Appendix, NSα−NNSβNSP Si < 0. Since E(Gi)
is identical for both smoking regimes provided that θi = θj , this implies a
negative welfare effect (cf. equation (16)), which can be “switched off” by
imposing a smoking ban.
With the negative externality from smoking being very strong, each bar
has the (wrong) incentive to allow individuals to smoke. While rational from
each bars’ point of view, the costs of this coordination are not matched by any
welfare gain since the smoking regime choice of competing bars are strategic
complements (cf. Proposition 1). Since bars end up being identical in equi-
librium, the expected size of the social network in the “smoking regime” is
identical to the expected size in the “smoke-free” equilibrium. The planner
removes the negative externality from the strategic behavior among bars and
implements the non-smoking regime.
We thus know that a general smoking ban increases welfare at least if
smoking is allowed by both bars in the market equilibrium. We are left to
answer our second question, namely to determine the smoking regime choice
of the social planner. Hence, we now ask which smoking regime generates the
largest welfare. Evidently, the optimal choice depends on the particular set
of parameters. Independent of the parameter vector, however, the following
holds.
Proposition 3 The optimal smoking regime is never a mixed regime.
Proof. Consider (without loss of generality) a situation in which NSα −
NNSβNSP Si < 0. This implies that W (θi = θj = 0) > W (θi = θj = 1). Due
to symmetry, it is also true that W (θi = 1, θj = 0) = W (θi = 0, θj = 1).
Eventually, using equation (A.2), we can show that W (θi = θj = 0) >
W (θi = 1, θj = 0) > W (θi = θj = 1).
Similar to the profit-maximizing bars, the social planner does not want
to implement a mixed smoking regime. In the market equilibrium, we have
argued that no bar is willing to “help” individuals to coordinate. The reason
the social planner is reluctant to choose the mixed regime, however, is some-
what different. Since the planner focusses on aggregate welfare, the allocation
of individuals among bars is irrelevant (recall that the social interaction mo-
tive enters linearly). Thus, there is no role for “bar visitor smoothing”. The
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planner is interested only in the negative smoking externality and the utility
from smoking. If the smoking externality exceeds the utility from smoking,
the planner bans smoking in every bar.
5 Conclusion
This paper argues that strategic incentives may pose an obstacle to the ef-
ficient allocation of air property rights, so that there is a case for publicly
imposed smoking bans in bars. While our claim is more general, we exem-
plarily introduce “social interaction” as a friction on the demand side, i.e.,
individuals looking for other interesting individuals when going out. To pre-
vent the first best, we assume that individuals randomize over their pure
strategies when deciding which bar to attend. This implies that individuals
solve a coordination game. In the preceding regime choice game, bars can
either allow smoking or prohibit smoking and thus be more attractive to ei-
ther smokers or non-smokers. We solve this two-stage game (the coordination
game and the smoking regime choice) for a Nash equilibrium in mixed strate-
gies in the coordination subgame and a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies
in the smoking regime game. Since a bar with many customers offers high
chances of meeting a suitable social partner, non-smoking individuals do not
generally avoid bars where smoking is allowed. Each bar has an incentive to
allow smoking if this attracts more smokers than it crowds out non-smokers.
Competition among bars, however, rules out mixed smoking regimes (the
smoking regime choice is strategically complementary). The intuition is that
bars are not willing to help agents to coordinate since every bar might end
up being the “wrong” bar. Hence, smokers and non-smokers are equally dis-
tributed among bars in equilibrium, and if air property rights are allocated to
smokers, the utility loss of non-smokers outweighs the utility gain of smokers.
With this, the model predicts that smoking bans, which have become ubiq-
uitous in many countries, enhance welfare. The intuition is that individuals
maximize utility by choosing the bars such that they are mutually indiffer-
ent (i.e., they solve the game for its mixed strategy Nash equilibrium). From
each bar’s point of view, there is thus an incentive to use the smoking regime
as a coordination device. This is especially true in a situation where the cost
(the negative externality from smoking) is large relative to the benefit (the
additional utility from smoking) since, in this case, more individuals choose
the smoking regime bar to compensate (through the social interaction) the
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negative net effect from smoking. The social planner does not need the use
of a coordination device. If the costs exceed the benefit, the planner will
ban smoking (and vice versa). We also show that the social planner will not
choose mixed regimes either (in this regard, the market solution is efficient).
This is because the planner does not care about the allocation of individuals
between bars, but only about the net costs of smoking. If these are positive
the planners bans smoking in all bars.
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Appendix
To rewrite the expected number of guests, we firstly collect the θ-terms in
NSφ2 +N
NSφ1 and N
NSφ2(θi + θj)βN
S. This gives
NSφ2 +N
NSφ1 = γ(N
S +NNS − 1)(NS +NNS)− (θi − θj)αN
S
−θjβN
SNNS ,
NNSφ2(θi + θj)βN
S = θiβN
NSNSγ(NNS +NS − 1)
+θjβN
NSNSγ(NNS +NS − 1)
−(θ2i − θ
2
j )βN
NSNSα.
Using these expressions in (9), the expected number of guests in bar i becomes
E(Gi) =
1
|A|
(−2γ2(NS +NNS − 1)(NS +NNS)
+(θi + θj)βγN
NSNS(NNS +NS) + (θj − θi)βγN
NSNS
−NSα((θ2i − θ
2
j )βN
NS − 2γ(θi − θj)).
Inserting the expression for |A| and simplifying eventually gives
E(Gi) =
1
2
(NS +NNS)
+
(θj − θi)βγN
NSNS −NSα((θ2i − θ
2
j )βN
NS − 2γ(θi − θj))
4γ2(1−NS −NNS) + 2γNSNNSθjβ + 2γNSNNSθiβ
.
If both bars choose the same smoking regime θi = θj , each bar welcomes half
of all individuals (smokers and non-smokers). Moreover, a parameter vector
that gives
E(Gi[θi = 0; θj = 1]) < E(Gi[θi = 1; θj = 1])
directly implies
E(Gi[θi = 0; θj = 0]) < E(Gi[θi = 1; θj = 0]).
Welfare can be expressed as a function of the smoking regime in bar i or,
equivalently, as a function of the smoking regime in bar j. Using (16) we
thus have (W −NSV S +NNSV NS =)
γE(Gi)(N
S +NNS − 1) + θiN
Sα− θiN
NSβNSP Si =
γE(Gj)(N
S +NNS − 1) + θjN
Sα− θjN
NSβNSP Si . (A.1)
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Suppose e.g. that θi = 0 and θj = 1. Then, after substituting with the
expressions for E(Gi) and E(Gj)) from (9), (A.1) becomes
γ(NS+NNS−1)2
(
βγNNSNS +NSα(βNNS − 2γ)
|A|
)
= NSα−NNSβNSP Si .
(A.2)
Now, if both bars choose to allow smoking, it must be that a unilateral
deviation from θ = 1 results in less than N
S+NNS
2
guests, i.e. (12) holds.
Thus, (A.2) implies NSα−NNSβNSP Si < 0 if θi = θj = 1 in equilibrium.
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